This is because cyber operations struggle with assured access, good estimates of effectiveness or extent of damage, or even certainty about for how long they will work (or even if they will work as intended). This process, a highly formulaic procedure (usually focused on a single theater) of allotting troops and weapons by phases of conflict, is unwieldy for cyberspace operations. Why does the Department of Defense need a new concept to do this? Cyber operations have been difficult to incorporate into the normal defense planning process. So, integrating cyber operations across theaters, domains, and phases of conflict is a good thing. This could include through deception and espionage, manipulating the information environment and decision-making, and potentially shaping or complementing conventional operations on the battlefield. Instead, cyber operations are more effective when they augment other military and foreign policy tools. It is also consistent with research that has found cyber operations have limited utility as independent instruments of coercion, are rarely decisive in conflicts, and are generally poor signals of resolve for deterrence. As Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin noted in his remarks, this new strategic approach involves “integrating our efforts across domains and across the spectrum of conflict” as well as “the elimination of stovepipes between services and their capabilities, and coordinated operations on land, in the air, on the sea, in space and in cyberspace.” How Would “Integrated Deterrence” Actually Integrate Cyber?Ĭyberspace is an important component of the Defense Department’s integrated deterrence efforts. What does integration look like for cyberspace? What will the strategy have to overcome in order to be successful? Is deterrence the right frame for strategic success, or should the new strategy focus more squarely on resilience? The answers to these questions can help guide the Department of Defense as they make the final tweaks to their new strategy and, hopefully, make the United States more successful not just in cyberspace but across domains. Recently, Assistant Secretary of Defense Mara Karlin emphasized that the Pentagon is “stress-testing ideas…so that everybody knows what we’re talking about.” In the spirit of this stress test and, since the Defense Department has a well-known track record with vague deterrence strategies and neologisms that seem designed to justify defense budgets, below we conduct our own stress test for cyber and the new strategy. But, gauging from some expert reactions so far, it’s not clear what successful integration (or deterrence) would look like in practice. According to defense officials, integrated deterrence includes incorporating military capabilities across domains, theaters, and phases of conflict rebuilding alliances and fostering innovation and technological development, all with an eye towards creating a more resilient military. But skeptics should be a little more open to the idea that the Pentagon is on the verge of pushing out a key idea that could solve many of its struggles in cyberspace. It’s hard to make a new national defense strategy an exciting watershed, especially when a curious and ill-defined term - “integrated deterrence” - is at the center of it. A major moment for America’s approach for cyberspace might be just around the corner.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |